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Abstract
On the Scalable Generation of Cyber Threat Intelligence from Passive DNS Streams
Anhar Haneef
Domain Name System (DNS) has become an important element of recent cyber-
crime infrastructures. Indeed, DNS protocol is being used, for instance, to operate in-
fected machines and transport malicious payloads. In this context, it is of paramount
importance to analyze passive DNS streams in order to generate timely and relevant
cyber threat intelligence that can be used to detect, prevent and attribute cyber at-
tacks. In this thesis, we explore the analysis of the aforementioned streams in order to
detect DNS anomalies that correspond to cyber incidents. By DNS anomaly, we mean
any deviation from what is expected in terms of regular DNS activities (queries/re-
sponses). The identiﬁcation of these anomalies leads to precious intelligence that
could pinpoint domains that are involved in malicious activities (e.g., spamming,
botnets, phishing, DDoS, etc.). We propose, design and implement a system that
analyzes, in near-real-time, passive DNS streams and generates cyber threat intelli-
gence in terms of: suspicious domains, DNS record abuse and passive DNS anomalies.
We correlate the generated intelligence with other sources of intelligence such as our
malware database. We dedicate a special care to the scalability of the proposed sys-
tem. In addition to picking appropriate data structures and database technologies,
we proceed with the distribution of the analysis over a cluster of computers using the
so-called map/reduce paradigm with the Apache Spark framework. Our experiments
show that our system is eﬃcient and scalable while generating important, relevant
and timely cyber threat intelligence.
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The Domain Name System (DNS) plays an important role in most Internet activities.
It provides a core service to Internet applications by translating domain names into
IP addresses. Therefore, Internet users only have to memorize domain names without
the need to remember the IP addresses, which are indeed more diﬃcult to remember.
DNS protocol is critical in the operations of cyber infrastructures including those
that are used for malicious purposes. In addition, there is an increasing evidence
that demonstrates the abuse of DNS to conduct malicious operations. For instance,
botnets use malicious domains as hosts for commands and control servers and change
these domains frequently to remain stealthy. Moreover, cyber criminals use fast-ﬂux
networks to frequently change the IP addresses of the malicious domains to evade
detection. In addition, DNS spooﬁng is another example of malicious use of DNS. It
replaces the IP address of a benign domain with the IP address of the attacker’s server.
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By doing so, the users requesting access to a legitimate domain will be redirected to
a malicious server. Another example of DNS abuse is the use of the DNS protocol
to transport a malicious payload (e.g., upload of the conﬁguration of a bot) or to
inﬁltrate/exﬁltrate sensitive information.
Nowadays, there are many attacks that are leveraging the DNS protocol. For in-
stance, DNS resolvers can be used to amplify distributed denial of service attacks
that are called Distributed Reﬂection Denial of Service (DRDoS) attacks. An infa-
mous illustration of such attack is the targeting of Spamhaus in March 2013 with a
DNS-ampliﬁed DRDoS [42]. Spamhaus is an anti-spam non-proﬁt organization that
provides large spam blacklists for research institutions and Internet Service Providers
(ISPs). It was one of the biggest DDoS attacks in history with a speed that is up to
300 Gbps of DNS traﬃc. The attackers were sending ANY DNS requests to a large
number of open DNS resolvers. They spoofed the IP address of Spamhaus as the
source of the requests, which generates a large number of responses that targeted
Spamhaus servers. This attack did not only aﬀect Spamhaus but also aﬀected the
entire Internet. Another notorious illustration of cyber attacks that leverage DNS is
the so-called DNSChanger malware [28]. It modiﬁes the DNS settings of the infected
machines by redirecting DNS queries to a malicious DNS server that takes control
over all the infected computers’ traﬃc. It hijacked more than 4 million computers
in US. To stop this attack, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) took action by
blocking Internet connections of all infected computers. Then, it took down the un-
derlying DNSChanger infrastructure. These two attacks give and idea how DNS could
be used and abused for malicious activities and how these activities could globally
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aﬀect Internet operations.
DNS traﬃc is generally considered, by most network and security administrators,
to be safe, and therefore, it bypasses most network defenses. Unfortunately, this
provides attackers with the opportunity to either instrument or abuse DNS to perpe-
trate cyber attacks. To mitigate this issue, security experts use static domain name
blacklists against such abuse. However, these domain blacklists lack eﬀectiveness in
terms of detection as a huge number of new malicious domain names appears on the
Internet every day. Some of these domains are even the result of Domain Generation
Algorithms (DGAs).
In this context, there is a desideratum that consists of designing and implement-
ing techniques that have the capability of ﬁngerprinting these cyber threats/attacks,
on DNS traﬃc, as soon as they appear. It is important to mention here that these
techniques absolutely need to be scalable as they have to deal with very large vol-
umes of DNS traﬃc in order to correctly identify the previously mentioned malicious
activities.
1.2 Objectives
The primary objective of this thesis is to address the analysis of passive DNS streams
for the purpose of generating timely, relevant and important threat intelligence on
cyber crime incidents. In this respect, our work strives to answer the following ques-
tions:
• How to analyze passive DNS streams in order to generate intelligence on cyber
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crime incidents?
• How to isolate suspicious/malicious domains, DNS abuse and DNS anomalies?
• What features of the DNS protocol should we rely on to ﬁngerprint these mali-
cious activities?
• How to make this analysis both eﬃcient and scalable?
1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are:
• Comparative study of the state-of-the-art approaches in terms of passive DNS
analysis. These approaches are analyzed and compared against a set of objective
criteria that we have compiled.
• Design and implementation of an eﬃcient and scalable passive DNS analysis
technique that provides timely and relevant threat intelligence on diﬀerent types
of malicious activities including: suspicious domains, DNS record abuse, and
DNS anomalies.
• Correlation of the generated threat intelligence with other sources of intelligence
such as our malware database. The intention is to get additional intelligence such
as the identiﬁcation of the underlying malware samples that are responsible for
the observed domains or behaviours.
• Design and implementation of two analysis modes: The ﬁrst mode, called general
detection, aims at analyzing the DNS traﬃc underlying every observed domain
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or IP. The second mode is optimized to deal with domains or IP-blocks that
are of interest to the security analyst and that need additional monitoring and
analysis.
• Design and implementation of a distribution technique that leverages the com-
putational clustering paradigm using the so-called Apache Spark framework in
order to achieve scalability of the analysis of DNS streams.
1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we introduce the required back-
ground on DNS and passive DNS. Chapter 3 presents a comparative study of the ex-
isting approaches to detect malicious domains using passive DNS analysis. In Chapter
4, we present our work regarding the near-real-time detection of anomalies on passive
DNS streams. Finally, we present the conclusion of this thesis in Chapter 5.
5
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Background
This chapter introduces the concepts needed to support the work developed in this
thesis. In Section 2.1.1, an overview of the domain name system is provided. In
Section 2.1.2, the passive DNS technique is explained.
2.1.1 Domain Name System
Domain Name System (DNS) [37,38] is a protocol designed to map domain names to
their corresponding IP addresses. An Internet user initiates a DNS query to obtain
the IP address of a speciﬁc domain name. For instance, the domain name www.
concordia.ca is mapped to its IP address 132.205.23.199.
In DNS, all the domain name space information is saved on a distributed database.
DNS protocol has the structure of a tree. Each node stores a ﬁle about a particular





















Figure 1: DNS Query Process
authorized by one or more authoritative name servers (AuthNSs). The AuthNSs have
full knowledge about the zones. They provide answers about the information stored
in the zones. Zone ﬁles contain multiple resource records (RRs) used for diﬀerent
purposes. A resource record consists of ﬁve parts: name, class, type, time to live
(TTL) and data. The RR name is the name of the node of the resource record. Its
length is limited to 256 bytes. The RR class deﬁnes the protocol family. It usually
assigns to IN (Internet) protocol. The RR type describes the usage of the record.
Table (1) presents some of RR types used in our work [1].
A DNS query is initiated from a user’s machine through its stub resolver. To get
the IP address of a speciﬁc domain name, the stub resolver is relying on a local DNS
resolver to get the required information. The DNS resolver contacts a DNS server
in case the cache is empty. The obtained IP address could be cached by the DNS





A 1 IPv4 address: an IPv4 address for a domain name
NS 2 Name server: the authoritative name server for a domain name
CNAME 5 Canonical name: an alias name for a domain name
NULL 10 Null RR: placeholders in some experimental extensions of the DNS
MX 15 Mail exchanger: domain name for a mail server
TXT 16 Text information: Text information associated with a domain name
AAAA 28 IPv6 address: an IPv6 address for a domain name
SRV 33 Service locator: speciﬁc services available in the zone
OPT 41 Option: pseudo DNS record type
ANY 255 All cached records: all records types available at the name server
Table 1: DNS Record Types
the DNS server in case the answer is cached by the DNS resolver.
The typical scenario of obtaining the IP address is: The stub resolver sends the
query (www.concordia.ca) to the DNS resolver (step 1). If the cache is empty, the DNS
resolver sends a query to the root DNS server (step 2). The root server is responsible
of all information of authoritative name servers of Top Level Domains (TLDs). The
root severs send back to the DNS resolver the IP address of (.ca) TLD servers (step 3).
Then, the DNS resolver re-sends the query to the (.ca) TLD server to obtain the IP
address of the name server of the Second Level domain (2LD) servers (concordia.ca)
and the .ca servers send back the IP address of the authoritative name server of
concordia.ca (steps 4-5). In step 6, the DNS resolver queries the authoritative name
server of concordia.ca and receives the IP address of concordia.ca (step 7). Finally,
the DNS resolver sends the IP address back to the stub resolver (step 8).
8
2.1.2 Passive DNS
Passive DNS is a technique where DNS queries and responses are captured by sensors
and replicated for further analysis. Passive DNS technique was invented by Florian
Weimer [55] to reconstruct the structure of the DNS traﬃc in an easy as well as
accessible format. There are many implementations of passive DNS replication tech-
nique. One of the most important passive DNS systems is a set of products/services
from Farsight Security [16]. The latter provides rich and comprehensive passive DNS
channels based on query/response pairs that are exchanged between recursive DNS
resolvers and authoritative DNS servers [22]. The passive DNS traﬃc is captured by
deploying sensors above recursive caching DNS servers in multiple networks around
the world [22].
DNS-based Security Measures
SPF (Sender Policy Framework) [30] and DKIM (Domain-Key Identiﬁed Mail) [13]
are exciting email speciﬁcation frameworks used by diﬀerent email providers. They
protect the domains and domain owners from diﬀerent kinds of threats such as email
spooﬁng. In addition, They decrease fraud threats by making it diﬃcult for the at-
tacker to forge sender addresses. The domain owners publish speciﬁcation information
in their domain zone as TXT RR because it is ﬂexible in terms of the size and the
format.
Domain owners use SPF to identify the mail servers they use to send emails from
their domains. When a mail server receives an email that claims to be from a speciﬁc
domain, it can verify whether the email can be sent by that particular IP address
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or not by querying the TXT RR of the 2LD of the email address domain. Domain
owners also use DKIM to validate that the incoming email is sent from a speciﬁc
domain. It is also used to check if the email has been changed during transit. To this
end, a digital signature is added to the message’s header. The digital signature can
be veriﬁed through the recipient by using the public key that is stored in the DNS
zone ﬁle.
DNS Tunneling
DNS tunneling is a technique proposed by Dan Kaminsky [23] to encode the data
by using DNS queries and responses. DNS tunneling bypasses most network ﬁltering
mechanisms due to DNS protocol property. It embeds the data as sub-domain label
in the query. It could be embeded in many sub-domain labels because of the limited
size of labels. It should use only the alphabet in the encoded data in DNS query and
response. The data is embedded in diﬀerent types of RRs such as TXT, CNAME
and NULL. TXT RR is mostly used due to its features comparing with CNAME and
NULL. The format of CNAME RR is restricted while NULL RR could be excluded
by DNS servers [32].
In Figure 2, the typical scenario of DNS tunneling is explained. Many requirements
are needed to tunnel the data. First, the host and the server should have access to
the internet. Second, the attacker should have control over the domain name and the
authoritative server of the same domain. The attacker has to add an RR which is NS
record to delegate the domain name to another name server. After that, the attacker















Figure 2: DNS Tunneling Scenario
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data in DNS query and sends it to the domain. The server receives the query, decodes
the data and sends back the DNS response.
DNS tunneling can be used to deliver any kind of information. However, it has
many limitations. First, it is only capable to send a small amount of data due to the
limitation of length of the RR query. Second, the size of DNS response is 215 bytes
which is small to send enough information. Thus, the attacker may use Extension
Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS) to increase the capacity of the DNS response up to 4096
bytes. However, some ﬁrewalls do allow bypassing any DNS response that exceeds
215 bytes.
Domain Generation Algorthim (DGA)
Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) [11] is a technique used by diﬀerent types of
malware families to generate a large number of domains. The generated domains are
used to locate command and control (C&C) servers in order to send data or receive
commands and updates. Some malware families tend to use old ways to locate and
connect C&C servers by embedding a static list of domain names with malware.
When the malware is installed on the computers, it tries to connect to the domain
names in the list until it ﬁnds the C&C server. However, capturing the static list
of domain names by security analysts could result in C&C taking down the malware
and blacklisting it from connecting with the C&C servers.
To avoid the problems of static lists, the attacker designed an algorithm that takes
deﬁned inputs and generates a list of domain names. Then, it attempts to contact
each domain name in order to receive updates and commands. Conﬁcker is one of
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the earliest malware families that use DGA. Conﬁcker.a and Conﬁcker.b generated
250 domain names over ﬁve diﬀerent TLDs per day. Conﬁcker.D generated 50000
domain names and attempted to connect to 500 domain names per day. After that,
this technique has been used by diﬀerent types of malware families such as Conﬁcker,
Murofet, BankPatch, Bonnana and Bobax.
Using domain generation algorithms to generate domain names has many advan-
tages. First, it makes shutting down the domain names diﬃcult for law enforcement
due to the large number of domain names and just in time registration. Second, it
makes getting the list of all C&C domains diﬃcult for static blacklists. Third, it helps
the attacker to avoid network ﬁltering systems [11].
2.2 Related Work
Many techniques have been proposed for detecting malicious activities and distin-
guishing them from legitimate domains using passive DNS traﬃc. Some techniques
are used to detect malicious domains that are associated with speciﬁc types of ma-
licious activities such as fast ﬂux and spam. In [40], Perdisci et al. introduced an
approach to detect malicious fast ﬂux services through passive analysis of recursive
DNS traces. Unlike the other works that are limited to extract malicious fast ﬂux
domains from spam emails [21, 26, 35, 39], Perdisci’s approach has the ability to dis-
tinguish malicious fast ﬂux domain names from legitimate domains by characterizing
features that pinpoint to fast ﬂuxing IPs. In [41], Perdisci et al. extended previ-
ous work, where they detect passively ﬂux networks from above local recursive DNS
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servers in contrast with the ﬁrst work, where they used DNS traﬃc from below re-
cursive DNS servers. In [3], Antonakakis et al. introduced Notos, which is a DNS
dynamic reputation system. It diﬀerentiates the malicious activities from benign ac-
tivities using many features. It assigns reputation scores for the new domains based
on models of known benign and malicious domains. The score shows if the domain is
malicious or benign. It has been deployed in a large ISP’s network and be able to ﬁnd
domains before the public blacklist. In another work [7], Bilge et al. introduced a
system to detect malicious domains, namely, EXPOSURE. They characterize passive
DNS logs to segregate between malicious and benign domains. The segregation is
based on 15 features. They conducted an experiment on 100 billion DNS requests
and deployed their solution for two weeks in an ISP. They managed to identify ma-
licious domains used in botnet command and control, spamming, and phishing. In
another work [8], the same authors extended their initial work, where they deployed
EXPOSURE for 17 months and showed the results. In [50], the authors put forward
a technique to identify botnets using DNS queries. The system uses Na¨ıve Bayesian
classiﬁer to segregate between malicious and benign domain names. The classiﬁer
achieves a positive detection rate of 82% and false positive rate of 8.30%. In [58], the
authors introduced a technique, which correlates successful and failed DNS queries
for the purpose of detecting DGA-based botnets based on the entropy of domain
names. In [57], Yadav et al. presented a technique to detect DGA-based botnets by
using distribution of unigrams and bigrams for all domains associated with the same
IP address, TLD or SLD. In [10], the authors presented a system, namely, BotGAD
(Botnet Group Activities Detection). They used an unsupervised approach (X-means
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clustering algorithm) to group domain names into clusters. Each cluster has a binary
matrix, where rows are hosts sending DNS queries and columns represent time peri-
ods. This matrix is used to compute a cosine similarity score to decide if the cluster
represents a botnet group or not. In [4], Antonakakis et al. proposed another system
called Kopis. It is a system that detects malware using upper DNS hierarchy. It
distinguishes between legitimate and malware domains using the global DNS query
resolution patterns. In addition, it has the ability to detect malware domains in the
absence of IP reputation information. The eight-month experiment shows that Kopis
was able to identify new malware domains before the blacklist. In [5], Antonakakis et
al. presented a system that detects the DGA-generated domains by analyzing Non-
Existent Domain (NXDomain) responses without the need for reverse engineering
technique. It uses two algorithms, which are clustering and classiﬁcation algorithms.
The cluster groups similar domains names in terms of structure. The classiﬁcation
algorithm refers the clusters to known DGA models. If there is no model to assign,
it generates a new DGA model. The system has been deployed on real time data. It
was able to ﬁnd new DGA families. In [46], Sharifnya et al. proposed a reputation
system to detect DGA-based botnets based on the symmetric Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence score to compute reputation of hosts mapping to a large number of suspicious
domain names. Their approach marked domain names as dynamically generated if
their distribution of uni-grams or bi-grams do not ﬁt the normal distribution. In [47],
the same authors proposed a negative reputation system that detects domain ﬂux
botnets. Unlike previously cited works, it relies on the history of the large number
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of malicious activities to a speciﬁc IP address beside the suspicious failures. It as-
signs a high negative score to the suspicious domains. They performed experiments
and managed to detect infected domains. In [25], Kara et al. proposed a detection
mechanism for malicious payload distribution channels in DNS. The authors used a
signiﬁcant amount of DNS traﬃc to identify covert channels that abuse DNS proto-
col. They proposed a technique that counts the usage of resource records to detect
payload distribution channels despite the fact that they have been rarely exploited.
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Chapter 3
Comparative Study of Anomalies
Detection Systems on Passive DNS
3.1 Introduction
In the past few years, many techniques have been proposed to monitor and analyze
passive DNS traﬃc. These techniques focus on detecting malicious activities includ-
ing spam domains, fast ﬂux domains, phishing domains, algorithmically generated
domain names and botnets using passive DNS traﬃc. Each approach used diﬀer-
ent features to detect malicious activities. Some approaches detect diﬀerent types of
suspicious activities and some of them target speciﬁc types of suspicious activities.
In this chapter, we present the existing approaches that have been conducted in the
state-of-the-art on the analysis of passive DNS. In Section 3.2, we present the existing
approaches that analyze passive DNS traﬃc. Section 3.3 presents the comparative
study performed on these techniques.
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3.2 Presentation of Existing Techniques
The scope of this study covers many diﬀerent techniques on the detection of malicious
activities using passive DNS streams. This section gives a summarization of each
technique.
3.2.1 Exposure
Exposure [7] is a novel technique to detect malicious domains based on passive DNS
stream. It uses machine learning techniques to build detection models. It uses a set
of features that are extracted from DNS traﬃc to identify the malicious domains and
distinguish them from the benign domains. After testing the system for two weeks,
it was able to detect malicious domains with high accuracy (98.4%) and low false
positive rate (0.5%). Thus, the authors deployed it for 17 months. It detected more
than 100K malicious domains.
Exposure has ﬁve components: (1) Data Collector, (2) Features Attribution, (3)
Malicious-Benign Domains Collector, (4) Learning Module, (5) Classiﬁer. The Data
Collector collects the DNS traﬃc of monitored networks. Then, the Feature Attri-
bution attributes the recorded domains with all sets of features(2). At the same
time, Malicious and Benign Domains Collector collects known benign and malicious
domains from diﬀerent sources. Then, it labels the recorded domains as either ma-
licious or benign using known domains. The labeled domains are the input to the
Learning Module which trains the data to build the detection module. The unlabeled
domains and the detection module are fed to the Classiﬁer. The Classiﬁer classiﬁes
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the unlabeled domains into two categories which are malicious domains or benign
domains. The system should be trained for seven days before it can be ready for
malicious domains detection.
Exposure system applies two ﬁlters to reduce the amount of traﬃc to manageable
size without losing any relevant data. The ﬁrst ﬁlter targets popular and well-known
domains. This ﬁlter removes all queries that are related to domains that are unlikely
to be associated with malicious activities such as Alexa top 1000 global sites. The
second ﬁlter targets the domains that are older than one year. Most of malicious
domains are detected and blacklisted after a short time of activity (several months).
This means if the domain is older than one year and was not detected by any tool, it
is not malicious. These ﬁlters removed almost 70% of the traﬃc which made it more
manageable.
Exposure was deployed for two weeks in large ISPs. It was able to detect many
unknown malicious domains with a detection rate of (98.4%) and false positive rate
of (0.5%). Because of the good results, Exposure was deployed as a free online service
for 17 months. It provides a daily list of detected malicious domains (200 malicious
domains per day). It detected around 100K malicious domains in total. However,
Exposure has limitations. First, it needs to be trained for seven days before it can be
used for identifying malicious domains. Second, it cannot detect domains that belong
to a malware family if the classiﬁer is not trained for that family.
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Feature Set Feature Name
Short life
Time-based Features Daily similarity
Repeating patterns
Access ratio
Number of distinct IP addresses
DNS Answers-based Features Number of distinct countries
Reverse DNS query results
Number of domains share the IP with
Average TTL
TTL Value-based Features Standard Deviation of TTL
Number of distinct TTL values
Number of TTL change
Percentage usage of speciﬁc TTL ranges
% of numerical characters
Domain Name-based Features % of the length of the LMS
Table 2: Exposure Features
3.2.2 Notos
Notos [3] is a DNS dynamic reputation system that identiﬁes malicious domains using
passive DNS stream. It assigns scores to new domains that indicate if the domain is
malicious or benign. High scores are assigned to legitimate domains and low scores
are assigned to malicious domains. It uses many features to classify malicious and
legitimate domains correctly(3). The system was deployed for real time data and was
able to detect malicious domains with high true positive rate (96.8%) and low false
positive rate (0.38%).
Notos system has two modes: oﬀ-line mode and on-line mode. In the oﬀ-line
mode, Notos reputation engine builds three modules. The ﬁrst module is network
proﬁles which extract network-based features of well-known domains (CDN domains,
popular websites and dynamic DNS domains). Then, it trains a classiﬁer to identify
whether a new domain has similar characteristics to the popular domains or not.
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The second model is domain name clusters which build clusters of domains based
on network based features and zone-based features. Some clusters contain malicious
domains that share similar characteristics and the other clusters contain legitimate
domains. The third model is the reputation function. It is a statistical classiﬁer that
assigns a score to a new domain based on evidence-based features and the output
of network proﬁles and domain name clusters modules. It assigns a low reputation
score to malicious domains such as spam campaigns and C&C servers and assigns
a high reputation score to benign domains. Now the training is completed and the
system is ready for on-line mode. First, a new domain is sent to network proﬁles
module and the output is the probability that a domain name belongs to well-known
domains. Second, the domain name is sent to domains clusters module. The system
extracts the features and identiﬁes the nearest cluster. Then, the evidence features
are computed to the domain name. Finally, the reputation function calculates the
score based on the outputs of the other modules.
Feature Set Feature Name
BGP features
Network-based Features AS features
Registration features
String features
Zone-based Features Average, TLD features
Blacklist features
Evidence-based features Honeypot features
Table 3: Notos Features
Notos is able to detect new malicious domains with high accuracy. In addition, it
is able to identify malicious domains before they are appearing in public blacklists.
However, Notos has some limitations. First, Notos could assign inaccurate scores
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to domains that don’t have enough passive DNS information. Second, it requires
time and large passive DNS traﬃc to train the system to be able to detect malicious
domains correctly. Third, due to the false positive rate, it is better to use Notos in
corporation with other defense systems not as a standalone system. Finally, Notos
would assign low reputation scores to legitimate domains that are hosted in bad
networks, which increases the false positive rates.
3.2.3 Kopis
Kopis [4] is a novel detection system to detect malware domains using passive DNS
stream at the upper DNS hierarchy. Because the stream is obtained from the upper
DNS hierarchy, the system has a global visibility that makes DNS operators work
independently to detect malware domains without needing other data from other
networks. It uses many features to detect malware domains including IP-reputation
features (4). The system was deployed for 8 months with real data. The result
indicates that Kopis has high detection rate (98.4%) and low false positive rate (0.3%-
0.5%).
Kopis detection system consists of three components: features computation, learn-
ing module and statistical classiﬁer. The features computation is used to compute
sets of features for observed domain names in the stream. The features are com-
puted after dividing the stream into epochs (one day). The learning module works in
two modes which are training mode and operation mode. In the training mode, the
module takes only the computed features from domains that exist in the knowledge
base (KB). KB contains a list of known benign domains (Alexa, DNSWL) and known
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malicious domains (public blacklists). The module labels each domain’s feature vec-
tor with legitimate label or malicious label. The statistical classiﬁer is used to learn
the behaviors that are related to legitimate and malicious domains. In the operation
mode, the statistical classiﬁer assigns label and conﬁdence scores to the domains that
are not in the KB at the end of each epoch based on the similarity with known le-
gitimate and malicious domains. After that, the average of the conﬁdence scores of




Mean, standard deviation and variance of BGP preﬁxes of requesters
Mean, standard deviation and variance of AS numbers of requesters
Mean, standard deviation and variance of CCs of requesters
Requester
Diversity
The number of distinct IP addresses
The number of distinct BGP preﬁxes
The number of distinct AS numbers preﬁxes
The number of distinct CCs preﬁxes
Average, biased and unbiased standard deviation and biased and unbiased variance
of number of domain names queried by speciﬁc IP during speciﬁc time
Requester
Proﬁle
Average, biased and unbiased standard deviation and biased and unbiased variance
of number of domain names queried by speciﬁc IP during speciﬁc time multiply by
the IP’s weight
The average number of known malware-related domain names, Spamhaus Block List
domains and the Alexa top 30 domain have pointed to IP addresses of given domain




The average number of known malware-related domain names, Spamhaus Block List
domains and the Alexa top 30 domain have pointed to BGP preﬁxes IP addresses of
given domain name during the last month
The average number of known malware-related domain names, Spamhaus Block List
domains and the Alexa top 30 domain have pointed to AS numbers IP addresses of
given domain name during the last month
Table 4: Kopis Features
The features that are used by Kopis detection system fall into three sets: requester
diversity (RD), requester proﬁle (RP) and resolved IPs reputation (IPR). First, the
requester diversity set of features is used to check diversity of machines that query
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a given domain name. The diversity of machines that query malicious domains is
diﬀerent from the diversity of machines that query legitimate domains. Second, the
requester proﬁle features’ set is used to check whether the revolver’s IP address rep-
resents home machine, small business or large network. It assigns weights to each
resolver based on the number of queries issued by the resolver. If the number is large,
the weight is high and vice versa. Malicious domains usually receive queries that are
issued from large number of resolvers with high weight while legitimate domains re-
ceive queries from revolvers with high weight and resolveres with low weight. Finally,
resolved IPs reputation set of features are used to check the history of IP addresses
that mapped to a given domain name.
3.2.4 FluxBuster
FluxBuster [41] is a novel technique to detect malicious ﬂux networks through analyz-
ing passive DNS traﬃc obtained from large numbers of local recursive DNS located
in diﬀerent places. The system consists of many components: message preﬁltering to
reduce the amount of messages by ignoring the messages that have no relation with
the ﬂux domains, domain clustering to group domain names that are mapped to the
same group of IP addresses, and classiﬁer to ﬁnd out which clusters are malicious and
which are not. FluxBuster was deployed on real passive DNS traﬃc for ﬁve months.
It was able to identify malicious ﬂux networks with a low false positive rate. The
malicious ﬂux networks were detected by FluxBuster before public blacklists.
FluxBuster starts by receiving passive DNS stream and aggregating DNS mes-
sages that are related to a domain name during a certain time. It summarizes DNS
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messages into one message that contains all mapped IP addresses, average TTL and
number of messages. Then, it ﬁlters the messages based on some ﬂux domain charac-
teristics (short TTL, large numbers of resolved IPs, resolved IPs located in diﬀerent
networks). However, this step does not remove all legitimate domains. Some of legit-
imate domains that share the characteristics of ﬂux networks still exist. After that,
domain clustering is applied to group the domains that have some similarity in terms
of their IP addresses. To ﬁnd the similarity, two factors are computed which are Jac-
card index and sigmoidal weight. The second factor is used to measure the conﬁdence
in Jaccard index. Each cluster contains one domain at the beginning. Then, every
cluster merges with the nearest cluster until one cluster is remained. It represents
the merged process as dendrogram and cuts it at certain height. The domains in the
connected subgraph after cutting are in the same clusters. After that, FluxBuster
use a statistical classiﬁer to detect malicious ﬂux network. Table 5 shows the features
that are used by the classiﬁer to detect which cluster is malicious. The classiﬁer is
trained on a data set that contains known malicious ﬂux domains and known non-ﬂex
legitimate domains. Then, it classiﬁes clusters as malicious or benign based on the
computed features set.
FluxBuster has a few limitations. First, each cluster should have at least 30 IP
addresses during each epoch to perform classiﬁcation on it. Second, the system needs
to observe at least one DNS query and response to a ﬂux domain to be able to detect
it. Finally, FluxBuster needs 30 hours to detect malicious ﬂux networks, which means
it will take a long time before taking action and stopping the threats.
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Feature Number Feature Name
1 Number of resolved IPs
2 Number of domains
3 Average TTL per domain
4 Number of domains per network
5 IP diversity
6 IP growth ratio
7 IP last growth ratio
8 IP preﬁxes last growth ratio
9 Novelty
Table 5: FluxBuster Statistical Features
3.2.5 CROFlux
CROFlux [19] is a detection system used to identify fast ﬂux domains through passive
DNS system. The system depends on public knowledge about malware lists. It
detects domains with ﬂux characteristics. However, it is able to reduce false positives
by discarding benign domains that have similar properties to ﬂux domains such as
hosting providers and content delivery networks.
CROFlux system has three components: (1) Preﬁltering of collected domains, (2)
Candidate domains clustering, (3) Detection of fast ﬂux clusters. The system starts
by monitoring DNS traﬃc and ﬁltering domains. It chooses the domains that meet
speciﬁc criteria which are: TTL should be less than 3 hours, the number of mapped
IP addresses to a domain is more than or equal to 3 and diversity of networks of a
domain is larger than 0.333. In addition, it takes a domain with less than 3 mapped
IP addresses if the TTL was equal or less than 30 seconds. After that, it calculates
the ﬂuxy score for each domain based on the number of distinct IP addresses, number
of dynamic IP addresses and number of distinct autonomous systems. If the ﬂuxy
score is more than 450, the domain is a fast ﬂux candidate. Then, it clusters the
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domains that have common IP addresses. Finally, it identiﬁes fast ﬂux clusters from
other clusters by comparing the clusters’ domains with private and public malware
lists. If the number of malicious domains in a cluster exceeds a threshold, it is a fast
ﬂux cluster.
The system collected DNS traﬃc for four months and detected 265 malware do-
mains with detection rate (91%).
3.2.6 Stalmans and Irwin
The authors in [50] introduced a system to detect fast ﬂux and algorithmically gener-
ated domains by monitoring passive DNS traﬃc. The system identiﬁes diﬀerent types
of features in order to classify domains. The system uses many statistical measures
techniques to classify domains as malicious or not. It was able to detect malicious
domains with high accuracy and low false positive rate.
The system contains two parts. The ﬁrst part for detecting fast ﬂux domains
and the second part for detecting algorithmically generated domains. For fast ﬂux
domains detection, many classiﬁers were employed and trained based on a set of
malicious and benign domains. They used a set of features which are the diﬀerence
between standard domain, CDN domain and fast ﬂux domain in terms of: (1) number
of A records, (2) number of NS records, (3) number of network ranges, (4) number
of unique ASNs, (5) average TTL. These features are used to distinguish between
benign and malicious domains. For algorithmically generated domains detection, the
classiﬁers were trained based on an alphanumeric character distribution. Legitimate
domains are diﬀerent comparing to algorithmically generated domains in terms of
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alphanumeric character distribution.
The system was able to identify fast ﬂux and CDN domains correctly. In addition,
it was able to detect algorithmically generated domains with 87% accuracy rate, 82%
true positive rate and 8% false positive rate. It was determined that Bayesian classiﬁer
is the best choice comparing with other classiﬁers because it provides high accuracy
with low false positive rate. The system increases the defense of the network.
3.2.7 Kara et al.
Kara et al. [25] introduced a system to detect DNS malicious payloads distribution
channels using passive DNS traﬃc based on access counts of RRs. The system uses a
set of features that diﬀerentiate between benign and malicious domains. It was able
to detect unknown malware domains in addition to malicious payload distribution
channels. The system was deployed for 30 days with real passive DNS traﬃc and
showed good results.
Each domain name has a zone ﬁle that contains diﬀerent types of RRs. Each
zone ﬁle has an authoritative name server that is responsible of receiving a DNS
query and returning the a DNS response. Attackers should have access to the name
server to deliver malicious payloads via DNS responses. To detect malicious payload
distribution channels, the system monitors the DNS zone activities and the access
counts of each RR. Malicious domains that used to deliver payloads are diﬀerent
from regular domains in terms of received query types. Malicious domains mostly
receive queries for RRs that used to deliver payloads such as TXT records while
regular domains receive queries for diﬀerent kinds of RRs such as A, AAAA and
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MX records. The system starts by receiving passive DNS traﬃc and extracting DNS
queries that have TXT records. For each domain name, it aggregates DNS messages
and forwards them to domain-based queuing. At the same time, the DNS traﬃc
is stored in a database for the purpose of oﬄine analysis. Then, the aggregated
messages are sent to the payload distribution detection module to ﬁnd the malicious
payload distribution channels. The system extracts the access count of all RRs from
the passive DNS database. For each domain name, it computes the ratio of access
count of TXT records to access count of other record types that are used by payload
distribution channels for a certain period of time. If the ratio is large, it means the
domain is involved in payload distribution activities.
The system applies two ﬁlters to remove the legitimate domains that have some
similarities with payload distribution channels such as SPF, DKIM, IKE and DNSBL.
Because these speciﬁcations are designed for mail server, MX record should exist in
the zone ﬁle. The ﬁrst ﬁlter removes any domain that has deﬁned strings in its TXT
records such as SPF or DKIM. The second ﬁlter removes any domain that is associated
with MX records. These two ﬁlters remove non-payload distribution channels.
The system was deployed for one month and was able to detect payload distribution
channels after applying the ﬁlters. It can detect the payload distribution channels
even if they changed their syntax because it is based on the access count of the RRs.
However, the system has some limitations. First, if the malicious domain that is used
for payload distribution is accessed for diﬀerent RRs such as A record, the system
will consider this domain as non-payload distribution channel. Second, malware could
send the queries to an open revolver instead of caching resolver. So, the traﬃc cannot
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be captured by the sensors.
3.2.8 BotGAD
BotGAD [10] (Botnet Group Activity Detector) is a system designed to detect bot-
nets using group activity characteristics by monitoring passive DNS traﬃc. A botnets
group has many activities such as receiving order, downloading updates and perform-
ing malicious activities. BotGAD was deployed using real time DNS data and was
able to detect botnet domains even if they use evasion techniques such as DGA.
The system consists of ﬁve components: data collector, data mapper, correlated
domain extractor, matrix generator and similarity analyzer. It starts by collecting
and aggregating DNS traﬃc using data collector. Then, the data mapper stores the
information in a hash map structure. It maps a domain name to IP addresses that
query the domain name and maps the IP addresses to the time of the query. Then,
the correlated domain extractor is used to cluster correlated domains based on sets of
features 6. The correlated domains could be domains generated using DGA, domains
from hard-coded C&C or domains from spam recipient list. The features that are
used for clustering are chosen from three diﬀerent aspects: (1) DNS lexicology, (2)
DNS query information, (3) DNS answer information. At the same time, the system
builds a matrix to ﬁnd temporal similarity of group activity using conventional vector
based method. The matrix contains the domain name, the IP addresses that query
the domain and the timestamps. The matrix generator marks the element with 1 if
the IP address queries the domain at that time and 0 if the IP address queries the
domain at that time. Then, the similarity analysis measures the similarity score of
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the generated matrix using the cosine similarity coeﬃcient. Finally, hypothesis test
is performed to decide whether the group is botnet or not.
BotGAD was deployed and tested on three real time DNS traces including large
ISP networks. It was able to detect known and unknown botnets in large networks
with more than 95% detection rate, 0.4% false negative rate and 5% false negative
rate.
Feature Type Feature Name
Number of domain tokens
DNS lexicology features Average length of domain tokens
Longest length of domain token
Blacklisted SLD presence
IP diversity
Number of queries sent
DNS query features Number of distinct sender IPs
Number of distinct sender ASNs
Query type (A, NS, CNAME, MX, PTR)
Estimated similarity of a domain
Number of distinct resolved IPs
DNS answer feature Number of distinct ASNs of resolved IPs
Number of distinct countries of resolved IPs
TTL value in a DNS answer packet
Estimated similarity of a domain
Table 6: BotGAD Features
3.3 Comparative Study
We compare the aforementioned techniques according to the following criteria:
• Approach: Techniques that are used to detect DNS malicious activities such
as clustering and classiﬁcation.
• Goals: Objectives of each system that is addressed.
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• Inputs: Description of diﬀerent types of system inputs that are used for many
purposes, e.g., benign domain list used to train the system.
• Traﬃc Level: Level of traﬃc where the system performs DNS monitoring.
• Training Time: Time that is required to train a system before it becomes able
to produce accurate results.
• Accuracy Rate: It deals with accuracy of system results.
• FP Rate: It presents false positive rate of each system.
We have chosen these criteria since they are important aspects that one should
take into consideration to compare the performance and the accuracy of systems. The
comparison is presented in Table 7
3.4 Conclusion
We conclude this chapter by making the following observations.
• Most of the techniques [41], [19], [50], [25], [10] are speciﬁed to detect a certain
type of DNS malicious activities (e.g., botnet or fast ﬂux networks).
• The techniques reported in [7], [3], [4] aim at detecting malicious domains gener-
ically and are not limited to certain types of malicious activities. They use clas-
siﬁcation approaches based on a large amount of training data sets. In addition
to the training set, their systems require extensive time for training.
• The training sets in question should be updated and the system should be reg-
ularly retrained. Hence, the system could keep up with the behavior of new
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malicious domains and malware.
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Table 7: Passive DNS Detection Systems
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Chapter 4
Anomalies Detection in Passive
DNS
4.1 Introduction
The Internet has undergone more than just being used for standard activities such as
simple look-ups of general or scientiﬁc topics. Its network expanded and the number
of computers and servers connected to, has increased exponentially. It results in being
an essential infrastructure for ﬁnance, business, communication, research and devel-
opment. Despite its popularity, the Internet has its own dark side, since it has been
turned to be a nest of cyber-crimes including information theft, scams, email spams,
malware infections, etc. As a part of the Internet evolution, DNS protocol [37, 38]
plays the role of a phone-book for the Internet. This protocol is considered as a vital
piece that allows host-names being accessible. However, it is used as an artifact for
malicious activities. For instance, domain names are used as proxies and command
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& control servers (C&Cs) of malicious networks enclosing infected machines. C&Cs
communicate with bots through DNS queries to perpetrate malicious activities like
key-logging, spamming and spreading infections through networks. DNS protocol has
been also used to conduct reﬂection DDoS attacks. As such, there is a desideratum in
the generation of cyber-threat intelligence based on DNS traﬃc replica. Thus, some
research eﬀorts [3,4,7,8,40] put an emphasis on using passive DNS to detect malicious
activities as well as DNS abuses. They use mainly classiﬁcation techniques to segre-
gate malicious domains from benign domains or to detect fast-ﬂux malicious services.
In spite of interesting results obtained by proposed systems in aforementioned works,
they have not integrated all-in-one solution to gather threat-intelligence. To this
quest, the availability of a tool that detects passive DNS anomalies is of a great help
for security experts since it allows to pinpoint abnormal DNS activities (e.g., frequent
change of city for a given domain, abrupt changes in DNS query number, detection
of new fast ﬂuxing IPs, TTL values change, malicious abuse of DNS records). These
abnormal activities are considered as good indicators to detect zero-day attacks, and
can be correlated with malware analysis. We perceive our work as being diﬀerent
in the proposition of a system that integrates an all-in-one solution, which has the
following capabilities:
• Design and implementation of an eﬃcient and scalable passive DNS analysis
technique that provides timely and relevant threat intelligence on diﬀerent types
of malicious activities including: suspicious domains, DNS record abuse, and
DNS anomalies.
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• Correlation of the generated threat intelligence with other sources of intelligence
such as our malware database. The intention is to get additional intelligence such
as the identiﬁcation of the underlying malware samples that are responsible for
the observed domains or behaviours.
• Design and implementation of two analysis modes: The ﬁrst mode, called general
detection, aims at analyzing the DNS traﬃc underlying every observed domain
or IP. The second mode is optimized to deal with domains or IP-blocks that
are of interest to the security analyst and that need additional monitoring and
analysis.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the detection of passive
DNS anomalies and abuses. The experimental results are discussed in Section 4.3.
Finally, concluding remarks are provided together with discussion of future research
in Section 4.4.
4.2 pDNS Anomalies and Abuse Detection
In this section, we aim to give an overview of the proposed passive DNS anomalies
and abuses detection framework.
4.2.1 Overview
We aim to design a system that monitors all domains and their DNS records as
observed in passive DNS stream. We intend to deploy a system that detects in near
real-time DNS malicious activities including potential anomalies and abuses of DNS
37
protocol observed on captured DNS logs. However, we faced some challenges in the
design and the implementation of our system. The main challenge is how to handle
the high volume of DNS data. We observe in average 38, 891.4 DNS records per
second and more than 6 million unique domains per hour. Sometimes, the traﬃc of
DNS data reaches more than 8 millions unique domains per hour. Thus, we need
scalable techniques to monitor the huge load of DNS data as well as a reliable storage
system for the purpose of identifying the anomalies and storing the results.
Our system targets to: (1) Aggregate real-time DNS data for analysis purposes.
(2) Segregate diﬀerent types of DNS records. (3) Identify suspicious domain names
and aliases. (4) Identify DNS records abuse, e.g., TXT, SRV, CNAME, NULL, OPT
and ANY. (5) Extract sets of features representing time series analytics. (6) Detect
DNS anomalies based on extracted features. (7) Correlate with diﬀerent sources of
cyber-threat intelligence. (8) Monitor and archive all DNS activities related to speciﬁc
organizations of our interest.
A number of previous research eﬀorts [29,45,56,59] used Apache Spark to analyze
the large amount of data. This has motivated us to use it as part of our system.
Spark monitors the huge amount of passive DNS data to extract anomalies. Such
framework that allows multi-purpose data processing is designed for intensive in-
memory and distributed clustering computations. It emphasizes on improving the
performance of applications that cannot be expressed eﬃciently as acyclic data ﬂows,
where a working set of data is across multiple parallel operations [60]. It includes
two use-cases, namely, iterative jobs and interactive computing, where Hadoop [20]
is deﬁcient. Hadoop is a processing model of on-disk data that supports single-pass,
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batch. A key asset of Spark lies in introducing the Resilient Distributed Dataset
(RDD). RDD is known to ensure the abstraction of data such that large datasets
can be cached eﬀectively in memory or disk. RDDs represent immutable collection
of objects grouped into partitions. Spark uses RDD to allow re-usability of memory
cached objects, which signiﬁcantly improves performance in work-ﬂow execution.
In addition to in-memory and disk caching, Spark supports many data abstrac-
tions, namely, graphs, streaming logs (e.g., Twitter feeds), databases (e.g., MySQL,
Cassandra) and hadoop data formats. Moreover, Spark has an elaborated program-
ming model, which was initially integrated by SCALA programming language [14],
then wrapped to other languages, i.e., object-oriented programming such as Java [36],
script programming such as Python [18], and statistical computing language R [17].
Spark provides programmers with the ability to: (1) construct RDDs from ﬁles in a
shared ﬁle system, (2) divide collections into slices that can be sent to multiple nodes,
resulting in computation parallelism, (3) transform data smoothly from one type to
another (e.g, a log to a mapping object) and, (4) alter persistence of objects through
two actions, namely, cache action and save action. Cache action leaves a dataset lazy
but kept in memory for re-usability, and, save action dumps data into a distributed
ﬁle-system like Hadoop File System (HDFS).
Spark supports also several parallel operations, namely, Filter, Collect, Reduce,
Map-Reduce and Foreach. Filter operation allows to eliminate items into collections,
that do not satisfy a boolean predicate function. Collect operation sends all elements
of a dataset to a driver for a parallel gathering of items into a collection (e.g., ar-
rays, lists, etc.). Reduce operation combines dataset elements through an associative
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function. Map-Reduce, known also as grouped reduce function, which allows to map
datasets to a common mapping objects like tuples and reduce them by a key entry
and an associative function. Foreach operation allows a streaming loop through col-
lection to execute functions like exporting results to databases or copying them into










































































Figure 3: DNS Anomalies Detection Architecture
DNS Eco-system aims to monitor real-time DNS replica logs. These logs contain
passive DNS entries enclosing information about diﬀerent record types (e.g., “A”,
“AAAA”, “CNAME”, “TXT”, etc). DNS anomalies detection system falls into the
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following components: Dispatcher, Record Extraction, Geo-location, Prediction per
Partial Matching (PPM) detection, Aggregation, Record Misuses Filter and Correla-
tor. Figure 3 illustrates the architecture of the system.
Dispatcher
The dispatcher component receives DNS logs and transforms them into streams of
RDDs. These RDDs are divided into four categories: (1) RDDs containing A records,
(2) RDDs containing AAAA records, (3) RDDs containing CNAME records and,
(4) RDDs containing records (e.g., “TXT”, “OPT”, “SRV”, “NULL”) that are the
inputs for DNS misuses like covert channels and tunneling. The dispatcher component
employs Spark ﬁlter action to check the resource record type and moves it to the RDDs
that contain the same type.
Record Extraction
The record extraction component takes RDD streams of each type as inputs and
extracts tuples as outputs. This component uses Spark map operation to produce
many tuples and push them to the next components that detect DNS anomalies and
record misuses.
Geo-location
The geo-location component uses a geo-location database called MaxMind [31] to
geo-locate IP addresses that exist in DNS “A” records. Usually, malicious domains
are mapped to many infected machines. Since botmasters have no control over the
geographical locations of the infected machines, the IP addresses of these machines
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are located in diﬀerent countries, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and Autonomous
Systems (ASNs). Legitimate domains like google.com and youtube.com are also
mapped IP addresses located in many countries and cities. Therefore, we use on the
ﬂy a white-list to remove all these domains and we geo-locate the domains that do not
appear in the white-list. The system takes a conservative approach, since it archives
all domains changing frequently cities and countries. Then, it cross-validates with
other features (IP-based features and TTL-based features) that will be explained in
the following sections. We collect the changes of countries and cities and place them
into immutable sets labeled by domain names. For this purpose, we use Spark ﬁlter
action to check if these sets are mapped to one country or city and remove all sets that
are mapped to one city or one country. Our system only geo-locate the IPv4 addresses
that are collected from “A” records and we decide to do it for IPv6 addresses that
are collected from “AAAA” records in the near future.
PPM Detection
The PPM detection component uses a technique proposed by Begleiter et al. [6] to
domain ﬂuxing activities and misuse of CNAME records. Domain ﬂuxing is one of the
techniques that are used by attackers where the malware change the fully qualiﬁed
domain names frequently. Such domains are used as C&C that send commands, store
stolen information and begin attacks. Domain generation algorithm (DGA) is the
simplest way for botnets to achieve domain ﬂuxing through the generation of random
domain strings. Canonical name (CNAME) records misuse is another technique used
by malware. They map malicious domains to machine generated alias domains to
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appear as legitimate domains.
The technique proposed by Begleiter et al. uses Prediction per Partial Matching
(PPM) algorithm, which is a type of Variable order Markov Model (VMM) algorithms.
PPM algorithm predicts the symbol based on previous symbols. It has two phases,
namely: training phase and prediction phase. At the training phase, it builds a
tree structure (Trie, in particular), which stores the sub-sequences of the training
sequences and the counts of the symbols that appear after them. At the prediction
phase, it calculates the probability estimation of sub-sequences of a new sequence and
compares it with the estimation of the training set. Our abnormal domains detector
computes the probability of a domain name to verify whether it is benign or not. In
our case, the training dataset is composed of diﬀerent domain white-lists (e.g., Alexa
top one million domains [2], Quantcast US domains ranking [43]). PPM algorithm
has two steps to build the training sequences. First, it reverses each domain name.
Second, it adds two delimiters at the beginning of each reversed domain names. For
example, google.com is reversed to ##moc.elgoog. The delimiters are used to separate
domains, which avoids appearance of noisy context in the training sequence. The
domains are reversed to let the training based on domain TLDs. Once the sequences
are ready, PPM classiﬁer stores the count of symbols that occurs after sub-sequences
of a speciﬁc length (distance) in the training sequences.
Then, the classiﬁer is used to calculate the average per symbol probability of the
50% of the training sequences, which are uniformly sampled. The computed average is
considered as a pivot score. The reason behind choosing half of the training sequences
lies in the fact that the pivot score should represent the average benign domain
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name. To determine if a new domain is abnormal or not, we ﬁrst reverse the domain
name and add the delimiters. After that, we use the PPM classiﬁer to compute
the average per symbol probability. Then, we calculate the ratio of the average per
symbol probability and the pivot score. If the ratio is less than a threshold (0.8), the
domains is considered as abnormal. Otherwise, it is considered as benign.
Aggregation
The aggregation component monitors diﬀerent features of passive DNS records to
detect DNS anomalies. Since the records are received each minute, we gather the
traﬃcs every minute. After collecting the features for a speciﬁed time window (2
hours for speciﬁc domains and IPs, 1 hour for the rest of passive DNS records) and
having enough samples, our system uses map-reduce Spark action to reduce tuples
generated by the record extraction component (See Sub-Section 4.2.2) and groups
them according to domain names. Then, we apply anomaly detection techniques to
identify malicious behaviours. The aggregation is done on the following features: (1)
Number of Queries, (2) Number of IP Changes per Domain and (3) TTL values.
Number of Queries: The number of queries that target a particular domain name
over a speciﬁc period of time is used as indicator of malicious behaviors such as domain
ﬂux and spam campaigns. Benign domains approximately have similar number of
requests over time. However, domains ﬂux is a technique where an IP address maps
to many suspicious domains. These domains often have abrupt increase in their “A”
or “AAAA” queries number followed by an abrupt decrease. Similarly, when a new
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domain joins spam campaigns, it exhibits abrupt increase in the number of queries
over a period of time.
Chauvenet test is a method that detects outliers by identifying a probability band
centered on the mean of a normal distribution with a certain standard deviation that
contains all time-series points. Any time series point located outside the probabil-
ity band is considered as an outlier. The algorithm has two inputs: the time series
points and a signiﬁcance level α (0.5). First, the mean of time series data (M) and
the standard deviation (S) are calculated. Then, we create a normal distribution
based on the mean and standard deviation. Using the normal distribution, we com-
pute a cumulative probability (P ) of each value in time series data from the normal
distribution. Then, we multiply the inverse probability by 2 to compute the criterion
value (P ′). Finally, we multiply (P ′) by the length of data points and compare it
with α. If the result is less than α, the value is considered as an outlier. Algorithm
1 summarizes diﬀerent steps to identify outliers for queries number attribute.
Algorithm 1: Chauvenet Test
Input: Data





for all V in Data do
P=CumulativeProb(ND,V )
P ′ = 2× (1− P );





The reason behind using Chauvenet test rather than λ1,t linear regression test to
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identify queries number anomalies lies in the fact that λ1,t linear regression test is
aggressive in terms of detecting outliers. As such, any slight change is seen as an
outlier. However, this is not the case for the number of queries, since we aim to
detect drastic changes instead of slight changes.
Number of IP Changes per Domain: Malicious domains tend to have many IP ad-
dresses. Thus, we decide to monitor IP addresses of each domain observed in the
stream. The system begins with gathering sets of IPs on 2 minute sliding window.
After the 2 hours for domains and IP- blocks of our interest, 1 hour for the rest of
domains, it indexes the collected IPs sets by domain names using Spark map-reduce
action. Then, it converts the sets to time series by computing the number of IP
addresses observed at the time t + 1 and not observed at time t. Using the time
series of each domain as an input for the scoring function, it computes the priority
of that domain. Domains having high priority are more likely to be malicious. So,
it is considered for investigation. Domains having low priority are rejected. There
are many legitimate domains that have many IP addresses. Thus, we use a white-list
which is a set of known benign domains to decrease the false positives.
The scoring function works following these steps: (1) computing the positive shifts
(positiveShifts) between time series values at time t and t + 1, (2) computing the
number of time series values that are greater than or equal to average of the values
(aboveAverage). (3) computing the number of time series values that are greater
than 0 (aboveZero). After that, the score is computed by summing the ratio of
positiveShifts and the ratio of (aboveAverage) and (aboveZero). Then, we divide
46
by 3 to normalize it to a value between 0 and 1. Algorithm 2 illustrates how the IPs
changes scoring function is computed.
Algorithm 2: IP Changes Score Function
Input: T imeSeries
Output: Score
M = Mean(T imeSeries);
S = Size(T imeSeries);
for all i = 0; i < S; i++ do
if T imeSeries[i] < TimeSeries[i+ 1] & i = S − 1 then
positiveShiftse
end if
if T imeSeries[i] > M then
aboveAverage++
end if






× [(positiveShiftse/S − 1) + ((aboveAverage+ aboveZero)/S)];
return Score;
TTL values: TTL value is one of the features that is used by many security experts to
detect DNS malicious activities. Most of the legitimate domains assign high values to
the TTL to gain caching advantages while malicious domains such as fast-ﬂux systems
tend to use small TTL values such as 3600 seconds or less as well as the round-robin
technique. It provides many IP addresses for a given domain name. These techniques
help malicious domains to stay available all the time and make it diﬃcult for DNS-
based Blackhole List (DNSBL) to detect them. One of the systems that uses low
TTL values to detect Fast-Flux systems is Exposure by Bilge et al [7]. They claim
that some malicious networks change their TTL frequently. These networks have
many bots and some of them are chosen to be proxies. Proxies running on ADSL
server are less dependable so, their TTL values are low. However, proxies running
on university servers are more dependable thus, their TTL values are high. They
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validate their assumption about TTL values with Conﬂicker botnet domains. Thus,
the frequent changes of TTL values as well as the low TTL values are some of the
characteristics that distinguish the malicious domains from the benign domains. We
use these characteristics in our scoring function to detect such domains. Algorithm
3 illustrates the steps used to compute the score. The algorithm has two parts. The
ﬁrst part checks if the time series values are the same and less than one hour (3600
seconds). The score is assigned based on the ranges that TTL values belong to. For
example, the TTL values belonging to the range [0, 1] have the highest score while
the ones that belong to the range [900, 3900] have the lowest score. The second
part computes the ratio of TTL values per range RangesRatio and the ratio of TTL
changes ChangesRatio. For computing RangesRatio, we multiply the number of
TTL value per range with a priority number. The priority number of lowest ranges
[0, 1] is the highest number (6) while the priority number of the highest range [3600,∞[
is the lowest number. Then, we sum them and divide them by 6 to normalize the
ratio. The ﬁnal score is computed by summing RangesRatio and ChangesRatio and
dividing them by 2.
Some benign domains such as Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) also assign low
values to the TTL and use round robin technique to ensure the availability. We create
a white-list of CDNs systems to remove such domains and decrease the false positive
rate.
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Algorithm 3: TTL Score Function
Input: T imeSeries
Output: Score
F = Frequency(T imeSeries, T imeSeries[0]);
S = Size(T imeSeries);
if S = F then
if T imeSeries[0] ∈ [0, 1] then
Score = 1.0
else if T imeSeries[0] ∈ [1, 60] then
Score = 0.9
else if T imeSeries[0] ∈ [60, 300] then
Score = 0.8
else if T imeSeries[0] ∈ [300, 900] then
Score = 0.7






for i = 0; i < S; i++ do
if T imeSeries[i] ∈ [0, 1] then
a[6] + +
else if T imeSeries[0] ∈ [1, 60] then
a[5] + +
else if T imeSeries[0] ∈ [60, 300] then
a[4] + +
else if T imeSeries[0] ∈ [300, 900] then
a[3] + +





















DNS protocol has been used by cyber-criminals as a carrier for communication be-
tween malware infected machines and remote bot-masters or proxies. Being in-
spired by the emergence of DNS tunneling tools (e.g., iodine [27], NSTX [51], Ozy-
manDNS [24], Heyoka [44], etc.), attackers have been misusing DNS records, namely,
“TXT”,“SRV”,“OPT”, “NULL” and “ANY”, to perpetrate malicious activities. In
this section, we present examples of how these DNS records can be abused.
DNS tunneling: Although being considered as a benign service provided online or
by customized tools, this service is a good artifact to exﬁltrate data from networks
that permit traﬃc to be sent only through a trusted server or proxy. By having a
moderate bandwidth (110 Kilobytes per second) and latency (150 Milliseconds) [52],
attackers consider it as a good medium to send blocked IP traﬃc through and conduct
stealthy communication between bot masters. In [48], Ed Skoudis claimed that DNS
tunneling malware is among the most dangerous attacks.
Malware covert channels: In [12], the authors explained the Modus-Operandi of
Feederbot botnet. Malware belonging to Feederbot family, exﬁltrates data within
DNS query sub-domain labels and inﬁltrates attack payloads in DNS response packets.
To detect DNS traﬃc generated by Feederbot botnet, the authors deﬁned empirically
a set of features that span over record data features and behavioral communication
features. Based on these features, they adapted an hybrid approach (clustering &
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classiﬁcation techniques) to detect malicious DNS traﬃc. In [34], Mullaney intro-
duced another malware family, namely, Morto, which uses a more resilient method to
exchange communication through covert DNS channels. Morto botnet sends a lim-
ited amount of payload, which makes its payload distribution stealthier in comparison
with Feederbot botnet.
DNS malicious responses: Attackers have put forward tools to send malicious re-
sponses in reply to DNS queries in order to test if DNS look-up servers are vulnera-
ble. For instance, dnsxss [49] is a tool that returns a string containing JavaScript to
“MX”, “CNAME”, “NS”, and “TXT” requests. By looking at Passive DNS stream,
we have found a lot of domains having “TXT” records containing script and frame
tags. If a vulnerable server does not sanitize “TXT” record data returned by such
domain, XSS attacks can be performed leading to some abnormal behavior in the
server side.
Indicators of DNS DDoS attacks: In [9], the authors stipulated that “ANY” record
is usually used in ampliﬁcation DDoS attacks since it has an ampliﬁcation factor of
52 as it replies with a response packet of 3, 336 bytes to a request packet of 64 bytes.
In [15], the authors monitored Darknet for the purpose of inferring DDoS attacks.
They observed that “ANY” records are in order of 52.23% of observed records involved
in DDoS attacks during a period of three months. In the prevailing of these facts, we
decide to monitor “ANY” records observed in passive DNS stream of data.
To extract record misuses, we use Spark ﬁlter functions on tuples. For instance,
“TXT” record is used to publish email sender policies associated with domains (e.g.
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SPF, DKIM and DMARK) and to identify veriﬁcation of diﬀerent search engines. It
detects misuse of “TXT” record by creating patterns that identify benign usage of
“TXT” record while the rest is considered as malicious. The “SRV” record is used
to publish services for DNS. Based on observations done on “SRV” record data, we
create patterns that identify if the record data is suspicious or not. In addition, we
capture all passive DNS entries that have “OPT”, “NULL” or “ANY” as a record
type. The reason behind doing so lies in the fact that such records are rare and can
be indicators of compromise.
Correlator
Our passive DNS anomaly detection system has been corroborated with a set of
scripts that correlate intelligence gathered from passive DNS anomalies with other
cyber-threat intelligence components, namely, dynamic malware analysis database
and VirusTotal database [53]. Threat correlation falls into: (1) anomaly domains
correlation, (2) anomaly IPs correlation and (3) DNS records abuse correlation. Re-
garding anomaly domains correlation, once we have a suspicious domain name, we
check if it is related to malware activities through the dynamic malware analysis
database. If so, we collect the diﬀerent malware names and use VirusTotal malware
naming capability to link the domain name to a set of malware families. In addi-
tion, we use VirusTotal URL scanner to check if the domain name is associated with
threats identiﬁed by VirusTotal. Moreover, we use the suspicious domain database
to collect the diﬀerent IPs associated with the domain name. These IPs are used to
gather geo-location information for the purpose of threat source identiﬁcation and
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proﬁling and be correlated with the dynamic malware analysis database and Virus-
Total search engine to potentially identify other threats. Usually, anomaly domains
have alpha-numerical patterns. Thus, we look into the dynamic malware analysis
database to discover other domains that may have such patterns. Once these do-
mains are identiﬁed, we repeat the same aforementioned correlation steps. Regarding
anomaly IPs correlation, we monitor mainly anomalies related to the change of IPs
number. For each domain responsible of triggering those types of alerts, we collect IP
addresses mapped to the domain by correlating it with suspicious domains collections.
In addition, we correlate the domain and its IPs with the dynamic malware analy-
sis database and Virus-total search engine to check if it is related to threats or not.
Regarding DNS records abuse, we correlate obtained DNS records’ data with DNS
traﬃc collected from the dynamic malware analysis. DNS can be used as a covert
channel for malware communication or a vector for reﬂection DDoS attacks. Thus,
we correlate any pattern found on “TXT”, “NULL”, “SRV”, “OPT” and “ANY”
data records with DNS traﬃc generated by malware samples.
4.3 Experiments and Results
In this section, we illustrate the performance of our application in diﬀerent aspects.
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4.3.1 Application Performance
Three servers have been dedicated to our DNS monitoring system. All the servers
use Debian OS version 7.8. In addition, they use a document-based database (Mon-
goDB [33]) to archive diﬀerent collections of data. Each server has speciﬁc char-
acteristics that suit its requirements. The ﬁrst server is used to detect suspicious
domains through PPM algorithm and misuses of diﬀerent types of resource records
(“TXT”,“SRV”,“OPT”, “NULL”, “ANY”). It is a Dell Poweredge T410 and has 64
GB memory, 24 CPU cores, and 3.8 TB space. The second server is employed to
identify the change of cities, countries and IP addresses and TTL values per domain.
It is a HP Proliant DL580 and has 125 GB memory, 48 CPU cores and 4.5 TB space.
The third server is dedicated to monitor suspicious domains through PPM algorithm,
the change of cities, countries and IP addresses, and TTL values of domains or IP-
blocks that are of interest to the security experts. It is a SuperMicro and has 125 GB
memory, 48 CPU cores and 4.0 TB space.
In addition, we analyze performance of servers in terms of memory consumption,
CPU usage and time delay. For the time delay, we aggregate scheduling and pro-
cessing time for batches. We monitor it through Spark user interface. For memory
consumption and CPU usage, we observe them through JavaVisual VM [54]. We give
diﬀerent observations of memory consumption, CPU usage and delay time for the
three servers. The calculations are done based on 18 hours logs.
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The First Server: PPM Detection and Record Misuse
The ﬁrst server is employed to detect PPM domains as well as misuses of passive DNS
records. The system reads data in slide batches of 1 minute. We explain the system
performance from various aspects (memory consumption, CPU usage and processing
delay time).
Memory Consumption We observe that the memory consumption of Server 1 is high
because of the large numbers of tuples received each minute. In addition, we notice
that the garbage collector is used frequently (2 to 3 times every 3 hours) to avoid
overhead usage of the memory (See Figure 4).









Figure 4: Memory Consumption of Server 1
CPU Usage For PPM detection and misuses of records, our system employs a ﬁlter-
ing technique to recognize suspicious tuples collected from passive DNS stream. The
batches are read each minute and no need for aggregation. We notice that the CPU
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usage of Server 1 is less than 50% of CPU. Sometimes, we notice an increase of CPU
usage which is due to the huge number of collected data received that minute. This
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Figure 5: CPU Usage of Server 1
Delay Time Due to the size diﬀerence of data received each minute, the delay time
of the application varies from 1 minute to 20 minutes (see Figure 6). The average of
the delay time is 2 minutes 23 seconds which is considered to be reasonable because









2 minutes 23 seconds
Figure 6: Delay Time of Server 1
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The Second Server: IPs and Domains Features Monitoring
The second server is committed to compute diﬀerent features of DNS. The features
are cities changes, countries changes, IPs changes and TTL values. The slide batches
of reading data is 2 minutes and the slide batches of the aggregating data is 1 hour.
We describe the performance in terms of memory consumption, CPU usage and delay
time.
Memory Consumption The System consumes most of the memory to compute the
required features. When the window batches of 1 hour are ﬁnished and the data is
ready for processing, the application uses the memory intensively due to the large
amount of data being processed (see Figure 7). In addition, the garbage collector
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Figure 7: Memory Consumption of Server 2
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CPU Usage The system uses the CPU massively every 2 minutes. These batches
store diﬀerent feature values including cities changes, countries changes, IPs changes
and TTL values. In addition, the CPU is used intensively after 1 hour to perform map-
reduce operation and insert the scoring function results to the database collections
(see Figure 8).












Figure 8: CPU Usage of Server 2
Delay Time The delay time of this application is high compared to the delay time of
Server 1 application (see Figure 9). The average delay time for 1 hour batch window
is 40 minutes and 48 seconds. However, this is considered acceptable due to the large
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Figure 9: Delay Time of Server 2
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The Third Server: Speciﬁc Domains and IP-Blocks Monitoring
This server is set up to monitor all domains or IP-blocks that are of interest to the
security analyst. This application combines all capabilities of Server 1 and Server
2. So, we monitor all the PPM domains, DNS record misuses and DNS features
statistics. Spark ﬁlter is used to distinguish the required domains and IP-blocks. Due
to the fact that the domains and IP-blocks are just a small part of collected DNS
records, we use 2 hours batch window rather than 1 hour to collect more data for the
features.
Memory Consumption We notice that the memory consumption of Server 3 is low
compared to the previous servers. However, after windows batches of 2 hours, the
application consumes more memory to compute the features statistics (see Figure
10). The garbage collector of this application is used few times since the application
is not using the memory intensively like Server 1 and Server 2.







Figure 10: Memory Consumption of Server 3
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CPU Usage We observe from Figure 11 that the CPU usage of Server 3 is low during
2 hours of slide windows batches. During the aggregation period, we notice an increase
of the CPU usage due to Spark map-reduce operation.












Figure 11: CPU Usage of Server 3
Delay Time From Figure 12, we observe that the delay time of application 3 is less
than 1 minute before the aggregation period (2 hours). However, the delay time is
increased at the end of window batch (2 hours) due to the computation of features.
The total delay average is 23 seconds and 658 milliseconds that is considered to be









23 seconds 658 ms
Figure 12: Delay Time of Server 3
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4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a system that detects in near real-time diﬀerent mali-
cious activities including suspicious domains, DNS records misuses and DNS anoma-
lies. Our system monitors all domains and their DNS records within passive DNS
traﬃc. However, due to the large volume of DNS records, we implemented Apache
Spark as part of our system. It is a framework that has the ability to monitor the huge
load in addition to store the large amount of results. Our experiments on real-time
passive DNS traﬃc show that our system can detect several types of DNS malicious
domains such as spamming domains, bitcoining domains and phishing domains. Our
system is also able to detect suspicious domains that are associated with several types
of malware families. In addition, we identiﬁed diﬀerent DNS record misuses such as
CNAME and TXT records. We believe that the results of our system can help security




The Domain Name System (DNS) is a cornerstone component that intervenes in the
operations of cyber threat infrastructures. As such, it is also being extensively used
for malicious purposes. Moreover, there is an increasing evidence that demonstrates
the abuse of DNS to conduct a wide variety of malicious activities such as operating
botnets, spamming, phishing, fast-ﬂuxing networks to evade detection, transporting
malicious payloads, and inﬁltrating/exﬁltrating sensitive information from organi-
zational networks. In this setting, it becomes essential to subject DNS traﬃc to
extensive analysis for the purpose of detecting the aforementioned cyber crime activ-
ities.
In this thesis, we addressed the problem of the analysis of passive DNS streams
for the purpose of generating timely, relevant and important threat intelligence on
cyber crime activities. Accordingly, we investigated the identiﬁcation of suspicious/-
malicious domains, the detection of DNS abuse as well as the ﬁngerprinting of DNS
anomalies. An important subgoal of the thesis was to cross-correlate the generated
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intelligence with other sources of cyber threat intelligence. A special care was ded-
icated to make the elaborated analysis both eﬃcient and scalable. In essence, the
contributions of the thesis are:
• Comparative study of the state-of-the-art approaches in terms of passive DNS
analysis. These approaches are analyzed and compared against a set of objective
criteria that we have compiled.
• Design and implementation of an eﬃcient and scalable passive DNS analysis
technique that provides timely and relevant threat intelligence on diﬀerent types
of malicious activities including: suspicious domains, DNS record abuse, and
DNS anomalies.
• Correlation of the generated threat intelligence with other sources of intelligence
such as our malware database. The intention is to get additional intelligence such
as the identiﬁcation of the underlying malware samples that are responsible for
the observed domains or behaviours.
• Design and implementation of two modes of analysis: The ﬁrst mode, called
general detection, aims at analyzing the DNS traﬃc underlying every observed
domain or IP. The second mode is optimized to deal with domains or IP-blocks
that are of interest to the security analyst and that need additional monitoring
and analysis.
• Design and implementation of a distribution technique that leverages the com-
putational clustering paradigm using the so-called Apache Spark framework in
order to achieve scalability of the analysis of DNS streams.
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Our experiments show that our proposed system is capable of uncovering important
intelligence about cyber crime infrastructures. Indeed, we have been able to map the
elements of several infrastructures that are perpetrating several attacks using botnets,
fast-ﬂuxing networks and malware distribution. In addition, our system demonstrated
high eﬃciency in monitoring domains and IP-blocks that are of interest. Furthermore,
our system is able to identify suspicious/malicious domains that are associated with
diﬀerent malware families. Although some of the detected domains have not been
correlated with any malware families, this could be an indication that the underlying
domains and IPs are elements of zero-day attacks. A very nice feature of our system,
compared to existing techniques, is that it does not require any training and does not
focus on speciﬁc types of threats.
As future work, we intend to experiment with additional features and time series
prediction algorithms and compare their performance and eﬃciency to the ones used
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